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Introduction
The Italian labor market is one of the most
tightly regulated in the EU. Italian labor laws
place strict regulations on the hiring, perfor-
mance and dismissal of employees. Many
employers, economists and center-right offi-
cials blame the rigidity in the labor market
caused by these regulations for limiting the
growth of firms and thus the prosperity of the
entire Italian economy.
Italy’s Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi,
supported by center-right politicians and most
business leaders, has made it his goal to reform
Italy’s most restrictive labor law, Article 18. This
relatively simple reform has become a contro-
versial issue in Italian politics. 
Labor unions, Berlusconi’s principal polit-
ical opponents, have used this issue to stir up
opposition to the prime minister and pull
together a stronger, more united center-left
coalition. Using the proposed reform of Article
18 as a rallying point, union leaders are
attempting to gather laborers and those on the
center-left to break the stability that Berlusconi
has enjoyed during his brief term. This effort is
now threatening to erode much of the support
Berlusconi needs to pass other reforms he con-
siders vital to Italian economic success.
In this article, I discuss Berlusconi’s
attempt to reform Italian labor law. After a brief
explanation of Italian labor restrictions and a
description of the specific law in question,
Article 18, I examine the effects Article 18 has
had on the Italian economy. I finish by explor-
ing the political struggle that has erupted over
this issue.
Italian Employment Contracts and
Labor Restrictions
According to Italian law, firms must sign
workers to contracts governed by collective
labor agreements between national trade
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unions and employers’ organizations. Wage
rates are set by these collective contracts or, in
their absence, by the court. These collective
contracts also set standards for trial periods,
during which time employers can terminate a
worker without incurring additional charges.
(“Labor Relations and Social Security”)
Contracts limited to a stipulated amount
of time are permitted only in certain cases
established by law. These cases include “sea-
sonal jobbing, intensification of operations,
extraordinary or occasional works and services,
and stand-ins for absentee workers whose jobs
are protected.” (“Labor Relations and Social
Security”) In all other cases, limited contracts
must be established by collective agreements
between labor unions and employers’ associa-
tions. 
Temporary employment, in which firms
hire workers through temporary employment
agencies, just recently has become legal in Italy.
Under this type of arrangement, the firm pays
the employment agency for the use of its
employees and the employees are then paid by
the agency. (“Labor Relations and Social
Security”) This system enables employers to cir-
cumvent laws that restrict the hiring of work-
ers for limited periods of time. These arrange-
ments have been permitted in an attempt to
meet some of the demands for short-term
employees without subjecting workers to the
insecurity associated with short-term employ-
ment. Although these contracts have added
some flexibility to the labor market, their use
has been limited. In 1998, only 21,000 workers
had made themselves available through limit-
ed contracts. (Roma)
Article 18
Of all of the labor regulations, those per-
taining to the dismissal of employees are of
greatest concern. Italian law divides dismissals
into two categories: individual and collective.
In both cases, the laws make it very difficult for
Italian firms to alter the size of their workforce.
A collective dismissal, or layoff, is defined
as the release of five or more employees from a
workforce of 15 or more within a period of 120
days. The law establishes that the conditions
and form of notice issued to the unions be at
least 22.5 days in advance in layoffs of fewer
than ten employees and at least 45 days in all
other cases. (“Labor Relations and Social
Security”) The law does not permit firms to lay
off workers for the sake of increased productiv-
ity. It allows that type of dismissal only if firms
can prove a reduction in production levels,
operational transformation or termination of
business. These terms can be difficult to prove.
Thus, layoffs can require much litigation and
cost companies a great deal of time and money.
The regulation of individual dismissals is
more complex and has become controversial.
These dismissals fall under the jurisdiction of
Article 18 of the 1970 Workers’ Statute, which
“rules on the protection of the freedom and dig-
nity of workers and of trade union freedom and
union activity in the workplace, and rules on
the public employment service.” (“Italy:
Workers’ Statute”) This statute is considered by
Italian workers to be their “Bill of Rights,”
ensuring them fair treatment by their employ-
ers and defending them against discrimination
and unfair treatment by their employers.
Article 18, which applies to all firms with
more than 15 employees, stipulates that a work-
er under contract may be fired only for “just
cause.” Just cause is legally defined by three sit-
uations: non-performance, frustration or exces-
sive burden. (“Italy: Termination...”)  Because
the three cases that constitute a legal dismissal
are extremely difficult to prove, courts almost
always rule in favor of the terminated employ-
ee, making it nearly impossible for a firm to fire
a worker under contract. 
If a court rules that the reason is unjust,
the employer must guarantee reinstatement. In
the event that the firm refuses reinstatement,
it must pay the employee remuneration owed
from the time of the judge’s reinstatement
order until reinstatement or until the end of the
employment period stipulated in the original
contract. The law also stipulates that if the ter-
minated employee is a member of a plant-level
trade union, the employer not only must pay
the remuneration but also must pay a fee equal
to the remuneration to the National Institute
of Social Insurance (INPS), making the dis-
missal of an employee economically unfeasible.
(“Italy: Reinstatement”)
Knowing that it is difficult to legally sub-
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stantiate a just cause for dismissal, firms sub-
ject to Article 18 rarely attempt to fire workers.
It is easier for them to keep an incompetent
worker on staff than to spend the time and
resources to prove non-performance in litiga-
tion. Thus, the law generates only a small num-
ber of cases each year, essentially guaranteeing
that no company with more than 15 employees
is able to fire any worker under contract. In
Italy this is known as the “job-for-life” guaran-
tee, considered by most Italians a national
birthright. They believe it is the government’s
job to ensure that they will have a job for life
and they see Article 18 as the only way to guar-
antee this. Thus the statute receives a majority
of popular support among the working class.
(Israely and Wallace)
Although there are similar laws in other
European countries, Italy’s Article 18 is the
most stringent. Within the EU, Austria and
Portugal are the only other nations that enforce
reinstatement. There is a movement by the EU
to loosen labor laws in several member coun-
tries, including Italy, in order to lower produc-
tion costs. The hope is that by reducing labor
costs, companies in the EU will be more com-
petitive in international markets. 
Effects of Article 18 on Italian Firms
and the Macroeconomy
As discussed previously, proponents of the
law (laborers, unions and center-left politicians)
maintain that Article 18 simply protects the
right to fair treatment by employers and that it
guarantees long-term employment to Italian
workers. Those fighting for the eradication of
the law (employers, economists and center-
right politicians) argue that Article 18 creates
inefficiencies in the labor market and that these
inefficiencies have caused a major drag on indi-
vidual firm performance and on the growth of
the macroeconomy.
One reason Article 18 may be harmful to
the Italian economy is that it limits companies’
growth. According to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the higher costs of adjusting workforce
size associated with highly regulated labor mar-
kets significantly hinder the growth of small
firms. (Scarpetta et al)  Because the law applies
only to firms with 15 or more employees, firms
often decide to remain small rather than sub-
ject themselves to the requirements of the law.
With a limited workforce, they are not able to
increase production beyond a particular point,
thus limiting their potential for growth.
Because small firms dominate the Italian econ-
omy (see article by Cunningham in this issue),
enough firms taking this approach would in
turn collectively hinder macroeconomic
growth. 
In addition, as the EU countries become
more integrated, the smaller Italian firms may
have trouble competing with larger firms in
other European countries. According to
Eurostat, the average firm size in Italy is only
57% as large as the EU average of 336.33
employees. These larger firms have more capi-
tal at their disposal and can use this capital to
penetrate the Italian market and outperform
Italian companies. This, according to econo-
mists, is a threat to Italian economic growth
and has been a basis for much of the recent
anti-globalization rhetoric in Italian politics.
Article 18 also hinders economic prosper-
ity because it discourages firms from signing
employees to long-term contracts. Because it is
almost impossible for firms to fire workers who
are under contract, it makes more sense for
them to hire workers on a short-term basis so
that they are not committed to any employee
for a long time. As evidence of this, the center-
right cites cases such as that of Francesco
Bruno, a 30-year-old college graduate who, after
years of working several short-term jobs, has
given up on ever finding a long-term occupa-
tion. “I see myself as a permanent temporary
worker,” says Bruno, who is waiting for a return
call from Alitalia, a major Italian airline, for
another short-term stint as a flight attendant.
(Israely and Wallace)  
According to those hoping to reform
Article 18, cases of job uncertainty such as
Bruno’s are becoming more common in Italy.
The number of limited contracts permitted by
regulators has increased dramatically in recent
years. According to Eurostat the number of
workers hired on a short-term basis rose by
14% from 1996 to 2001. The reformers
attribute this growth in short-term contracts
to an increase in the need for a job market with
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U.S.-style flexibility and contend that the elim-
ination of Article 18 would provide this flexi-
bility without subjecting workers to the type of
job instability they now face under limited con-
tracts.
According to an article in the May 6, 2002,
issue of Time International, “Berlusconi says
Italy can’t compete — and good new jobs will
never be created for people like Bruno — if
companies feel they can never fire workers.”
(Israely and Wallace)  The same sentiment is
expressed by Antonio D’Amanto, head of
Confindustria, the largest employers’ associa-
tion in Italy, which is fighting to eliminate
Article 18. When responding to criticism that
the group was interested in the reform to make
it easier for them to lay off workers, he stated
that they “have never asked for the freedom to
fire, but instead for the freedom to hire.”
(Israely and Wallace)
Not only does Article 18 give incentive to
firms to hire workers under short-term con-
tracts, but it also encourages them to hire
workers in the black market. This is considered
a negative effect because black market labor is
unregulated by the government, which means
that those hired in the black market do not
receive any government protection and can be
forced to work in substandard conditions. As
proof that Article 18 encourages companies to
hire black market workers, the center-right
reports that according to EU statistics only
54.5% of working-age people officially are at
work (lowest proportion in the EU) and that the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates
that 27% of the country’s GDP is produced by
black market labor. (“Berlusconi 2, Cofferati 1”)
Strict labor laws, such as Article 18, also
may have a negative impact on firms’ produc-
tivity. Employment protection laws, such as
Article 18, reduce workers’ incentives to work
hard and allow them to fail to meet their
employers’ expectations. Joe Klein, writing in
The New Yorker about the battle over Article
18, included a hypothetical example to illustrate
how the law creates an inefficient workplace:
[Suppose that] “Giovanni the welder has taken
up the unfortunate habit of napping on the job,
you probably have to go to court to get rid of
him. Consequently, there is a fair amount of
napping — or the moral equivalent of the same
— going on in Italy.” (Klein)
To reiterate, the high costs of attempting
to fire an employee act as a deterrent. As a
result, many incompetent, lazy or otherwise
unproductive workers remain employed, low-
ering many firms’ productivity. As expected, the
productivity of Italian firms lags well behind
their European competitors. From 1996 to
1999, unit labor costs in Italy were 17.1% above
those in Germany and 16.5% above those in
France. During the same period, Italian labor
productivity was 12.9% lower than the produc-
tivity of German labor and 9.9% behind that of
French labor. 
According to the OECD, strict labor regu-
lations also have greatly reduced firms’ pro-
ductivity by reducing their incentives to adopt
new technology. This is especially true during
times of rapid technologic innovation. The
implementation of new technologies usually
requires a shift in the optimal mix between
physical capital and labor. Because Italian labor
regulations raise the cost of adjusting workforce
size, any benefit that could be gained by imple-
menting new technologies is offset by the
expense of changing the optimal mix.1
(Scarpetta et al)
This effect contributes to the lack of
research and development (R&D) spending
among Italian firms. Statistics published by the
OECD show that R&D spending by Italian firms
is far below that of other major industrialized
countries. Whereas R&D expenditures totaled
2.20% of the GDP in France and 2.32% in
Germany, Italy spent only 1.03% of its GDP.
Another criticism of Article 18 is that the
rigidity in the labor market it creates prohibits
firms from shedding excess workers during
times of economic contraction and prevents
firms from hiring more workers during periods
of economic growth. “Article 18 discourages
firms from hiring, deters foreign firms from
investing in Italy and is a deadweight on busi-
ness, especially in the country’s poor southern
regions, argues the Confindustria...” (“The
Trade Unions Hit Back....”) With firms unable
1This helps explain why U.S. firms, which operate in a
relatively flexible labor market, held such a large lead over
their European counterparts, who have rigid labor mar-
kets, in the implementation of communication technolo-
gies in the 1990s. This well documented lead was one of
the main reasons that the U.S. economy enjoyed much
more rapid growth during this time.
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to fire workers during economic recessions,
they cannot cut down on excess expenses and
make improvements in productivity, which
would otherwise spark economic recovery.
Likewise, during periods of prosperity, firms’
reluctance to hire more than 14 employees hin-
ders their ability to expand production, thus
impeding the growth of the entire economy.
In the same way that the law prevents
existing firms from growing during economic
expansions, Article 18 also may hinder eco-
nomic growth by discouraging the entry of new
firms. According to the OECD, “empirical
analysis of entry reveals that market regulations
and employment protection legislation (EPL)
have a strong effect on market access of small-
and medium-sized firms.” (Scarpetta et al)  The
report continues, “there appears to be relative-
ly straightforward evidence that strict regula-
tions on entrepreneurial activity, and high costs
of adjusting the workforce, negatively affect the
entry of new (small) firms.” The report adds an
explanation of how a strictly regulated labor
market can produce slower economic growth:  
Low administrative costs of start-ups
and not unduly strict regulations on
labor adjustment in the United States
are likely to stimulate potential
entrepreneurs to start on a small
scale, test the market and, if suc-
cessful with their business plan,
expand rapidly to reach the mini-
mum efficient scale. In contrast,
higher entry and adjustment costs in
Europe may stimulate a pre-market
selection of business plans with less
market experimentation... In a peri-
od (like the present) of rapid 
diffusion of a new technology (infor-
mation and communication tech-
nology), greater experimentation
may allow new ideas and forms of
production to emerge more rapidly,
thereby leading to a faster process of
innovation and technology adoption.
By limiting the entry and growth of small firms,
Article 18 limits the creation of employment
opportunities. Furthermore, by impeding the
entry and expansion of small firms, which could
be a major source of economic growth, this law
is eliminating a force that could lead Italy out
of its current recession. 
Political Struggle over Labor Law
Reform
The Italian political system has suffered
from instability since its reconstruction fol-
lowing World War II. In this country, where the
governments seem to change with the seasons,
prime ministers and their cabinets rarely are in
power long enough and usually do not hold
enough of a majority to pass any meaningful
reforms. This, however, has not been the case
during the past few years. Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi, who in his first two years in office
(2001–2003) has enjoyed unprecedented sup-
port, is making a serious attempt to push
through several economic reforms that he and
others in the center-right believe would help
Italy become more competitive in the global
economy.
At the top of Berlusconi’s list is the pro-
posed reform of Article 18. This proposal, which
would effectively abolish Article 18, has become
an intensely debated topic in Italian politics.
The issue has inflamed Berlusconi’s opposition
and threatened to erode much of his support.
The main forces behind the proposed
reforms to Article 18 have been the
Confindustria and the center-right government
under the leadership of the Prime Minister.
These groups are attempting to completely
eliminate Article 18 — the first step in a series
of economic and political reforms that
Berlusconi’s government claims it will put in
place to promote sustained economic growth.
Those hoping to reform Article 18 have
been staunchly opposed by labor unionists and
political officials on the center-left, who have
come together under the leadership of Sergio
Cofferati, the former head of the CGIL, Italy’s
largest and most militant labor union. This
group is determined to stop Berlusconi from
succeeding in his attempt to abolish what they
feel is their only protection against employers
who wish to take advantage of their workers.
They are using this issue as a means of
strengthening support for their coalition, which
fell apart before the national election in the
spring of 2001 and allowed Berlusconi’s center-
right government to grab control of the
Parliament. 
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There has been a wave of escalating ten-
sion surrounding this issue since the spring of
2001. On March 19, 2002, Marco Biagi, a promi-
nent labor economist and consultant to
Berlusconi’s center-right government, was shot
in what is believed to be a politically motivated
assassination. Biagi was notorious for support-
ing welfare and labor law reform. The Red
Brigade, an ultra-left-wing terrorist group,
claimed responsibility for the slaying. In an
attempt to harm the image of the union many
center-right government officials proclaimed
that the group, responsible for various terror-
ist attacks in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s
on behalf of the communist movement, is
working in connection with union leaders. This
accusation was denied fervently by Cofferati and
the CGIL. 
To show its defiance, the CGIL went on
with a previously planned protest on March 23,
2002. Between one and two million people
assembled in Rome’s Circus Maximus to protest
Berlusconi and his proposed reform. Then on
April 16, Cofferati succeeded in convincing
Italy’s two smaller national trade unions, the
CISL and the UIL, to join his CGIL in a nation-
wide strike, the first such strike since 1982.
These events were planned not only to protest
the planned reforms to Article 18 but also to
demonstrate their disapproval of both the cen-
ter-right government and Berlusconi himself.
Finally in June 2002, the two smaller
unions, the CISL and the UIL, reached a con-
troversial agreement with Berlusconi’s govern-
ment on an alteration of Article 18. In this
agreement both sides made compromises.
Instead of the complete eradication of Article
18, Berlusconi agreed to suspend the law only
for a three-year trial period for small firms
planning to expand above 15 employees. The
agreement does not fully meet Berlusconi’s
original goal to eliminate the article but is seen
by the center-right as an important step in the
right direction. 
Cofferati, as expected, was enraged by the
accord. On July 8, 2002, he resigned from his
position as leader of the CGIL to pursue ambi-
tions in politics. He has vowed to fight this
agreement and promises to take his case to
Italy’s Constitutional Court to have the reform
overruled.
Most observers believe this reform is nec-
essary to promote economic growth and that it
is not a drastic change for most Italian work-
ers. In reality less than one-third of the Italian
workforce is covered by Article 18,2 yet several
million laborers not covered by the law support
the unions’ stance. And even though most left-
wing economists agree that the proposed
reform is beneficial to the Italian economy,
many unionists are starkly opposed to any alter-
ation of the law. It appears as though Cofferati
is using this issue as a rallying call to pull
together a left-wing coalition that can stand up
to and compete with the center-right coalition
that won election in 2001.
On the other side of the struggle,
Berlusconi apparently is determined to force
this reform through before moving on to tack-
le more important issues that he has promised
to address such as pension, healthcare and edu-
cation reform. With his comfortable majority
in Parliament, it may be possible for Berlusconi
to push the reform through even without union
support. However, the Prime Minister, who was
ousted from office in 1994 after just seven
months because of a series of general strikes,
must be careful that he does not give the oppo-
sition a point around which it can unite. 
Gaining the support of the UIL and CISL
was an important step in Berlusconi’s quest to
abolish this law, but the battle is not yet won.
The formation of a sizeable left-wing coalition
under Cofferati’s leadership could be disastrous
for Berlusconi’s government, which has gained
most of its success because of the many divi-
sions and lack of central leadership among the
left-wing parties. If Berlusconi hopes to remain
in power long enough to pass all of his reforms,
he must find a way to eliminate Article 18 with-
out greatly upsetting laborers and union lead-
ers. If unable to do this, he may have to hold off
on this reform until economic conditions
improve and he is able to gain more support. 
2This is because most workers are either employed by
companies that have fewer than 15 workers and therefore
are not subject to Article 18’s restrictions or they are
employed in black market operations.
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